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Epistemologia

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Secundum Platonem, omnis scientia (circulus flavus) est propositio vera (circulus ruber) et credita (circulus caeruleus). Tabula Anglice signata.

Epistemologia[1] (ab Anglico epistemology a verbis Graecis ἐπιστήμη 'scientia' + λόγος 'sermo; ratio' deductum) est pars philosophiae quae de natura et finibus scientiae et perceptionis tractat.[2][3] Quaestiones magni momenti in epistemologia sunt:

  • Quid sit scientia
  • Quomodo adsumatur scientia
  • Quot res sciri possint.

Disceptationes in hac disciplina ortae plerumque ad ingenium scientiae explicandum contulerunt, et quidem ad id pertinuerunt, quomodo haec disputationes ad notiones propinquas — veritatem, fidem, iustificationem — referantur. Sceptici autem docent nullam scientiam certam esse. Omnia haec aliquando doctrina scientiae appellantur.

Nomen epistemology a Iacobo Friderico Ferrier (1808–1864) philosopho Scotico Anglice excogitatum est.[4]

Scientia quod, scientia quomodo, scientia per familiaritatem[recensere | fontem recensere]

Hoc in commentario, et latissime in epistemologia, genus scientiae usitate disceptum est logica propositionalis, etiam "scientia quod" appellatum, notio quae a "scientia quomodo" et "scientia per familiaritatem" distinguenda est. Exempli gratia: in mathematica, scitur quod 2 + 2 = 4, sed est scientia quomodo addere duos numeros et scire personam (e.g., se), locum (e.g., sui locus natalis), rem (e.g., automobilia), vel industriam (e.g., additio). Nonnulli philosophi putant esse distinctionem magni momenti inter "scientiam quod," "scientiam quomodo," et "scientiam per familiaritatem," quarum epistemologia praecipue primam curat.

Bertrandus Russell in libro Problems of Philosophy "scientiam per descriptionem" (genus scientiae quod) et "scientiam per familiaritatem" insigniter distinguit. Gilbertus Ryle saepe habetur in The Concept of Mind distinctionem "scientiae quomodo" et "scientiae quod" vehementius dixisse. In Personal Knowledge, Michael Polanyi arguit "scientiam quomodo" et "scientiam quod" ad epistemologicam attingunt; per exemplum actionis hominis qui se librat cum birotam vehitur, subicit theoreticam physicae scientiam usum quomodo vehi substituere non posse, et scire quomodo ambo instituuntur et conduntur esse magni momenti. Haec positio necessario est positio Ryle, qui arguit non confiteri distinctionem "scientiae quod" et "scientiae quomodo" ad regressus vitiosos ducere.

Temporibus recentioribus, nonnulli epistemologi (Greco, Kvanvig, Sosa, Zagzebski) arguerunt epistemologiam proprietates hominum (h.e., virtutes intellectus) et non solum proprietates propositionum vel animorum propositionalium aestimandam esse.

Scholae Epistemologiae[recensere | fontem recensere]

Epistemologi clarissimi[recensere | fontem recensere]

Vide etiam[recensere | fontem recensere]

Notae[recensere | fontem recensere]

  1. Axters, S. (1937). Scholastiek lexicon Latijn-Nederlandsch. Antwerpen: Geloofsverdediging.
  2. G & C. Merriam Co. (1913). Noah Porter. ed. Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913 ed.). G & C. Merriam Co.. p. 501 .
  3. Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 3 (Macmillan, 1967).
  4. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, 2007.

Bibliographia[recensere | fontem recensere]

  • Annis, David. 1978. A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification. American Philosophical Quarterly 15:213–219.
  • Ayer, Alfred Jules. 1936. Language, Truth, and Logic.
  • BonJour, Laurence. 2002. Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses. Lanham, Terrae Mariae: Rowman & Littlefield.
  • Boufoy-Bastick, Z. 2005. Introducing "Applicable Knowledge" as a Challenge to the Attainment of Absolute Knowledge. Sophia: Journal of Philosophy 8:39–51.
  • Bovens, Luc, et Stephan Hartmann. 2003. Bayesian Epistemology. Oxoniae: Oxford University Press.
  • Butchvarov, Panayot. 1970. The Concept of Knowledge. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
  • Cohen, Stewart.1998. Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Skepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76(2):289–306. doi 10.1080/00048409812348411.
  • Cohen, Stewart. 1999. Contextualism, Skepticism, and Reasons. In Epistemology, ed. James Tomberlin. Blackwell Publishing.
  • Dancy, Jonathan. 1991. An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Ed. 2a. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 0-631-13622-3.
  • DeRose, Keith. 1992. Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15:213–219.
  • DeRose, Keith. 1999. Contextualism: An Explanation and Defense. In Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, ed. J. Greco et E. Sosa. Blackwell Publishing.
  • Descartes, Rene. 1641. Meditations on First Philosophy.
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  • Gettier, Edmund. 1963. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23:121–123. Versio interretialis.
  • Greco, J., et E. Sosa. 1999. Blackwell Publishing.
  • Harris, Errol E. 1970. Hypothesis And Perception. Londinii: George Allen and Unwin. Liber retractatus, 2002, Londinii: Routledge.
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  • Kirkham, Richard. 1984. Does the Gettier Problem Rest on a Mistake? Mind 93.
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  • Kyburg, H. E. 1961. Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Middletown Connecticutae: Wesleyan University Press.
  • Korzybski, Alfred. 1933, 1994. Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics. Ed. 5a. Ft. Worth Texiae: Institute of General Semantics.
  • Lewis, David. 1996. Elusive Knowledge. Australian Journal of Philosophy 74(4):549–567. doi 10.1080/00048409612347521.
  • Morin, Edgar. 1986. La Méthode, Tome 3, La Connaissance de la connaissance.
  • Morton, Adam. 2002. A Guide Through the Theory of Knowledge. Ed. 3a. Oxoniae: Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 1-4051-0012-5.
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  • Popper, Karl R. 1972. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxoniae: Oxford Univ. Press.
  • Preyer, G., F. Siebelt, et A. Ulfig. 1994. Language, Mind and Epistemology. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  • Rand, Ayn. 1979. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. Novi Eboraci: Meridian.
  • Russell, Bertrand. 1912. The Problems of Philosophy. Novi Eboraci: Oxford University Press.
  • Russell, Bertrand. 1940. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. Nottingham: Spokesman Books.
  • Santayana, George. 1923. Scepticism and Animal Faith. Novi Eboraci: Charles Scribner's Sons. Londinii: Constable and Co.
  • Spir, Afrikan. 1877. Denken und Wirklichkeit: Versuch einer Erneuerung der kritischen Philosophie. Ed. 2a. Lipsiae: J. G. Findel.
  • Schiffer, Stephen. 1996. Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96:317–333.
  • Steup, Matthias. 2005. Knowledge and Skepticism. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, ed. Peter Sosa et Matthias Steup, 1–13.
  • Tomberlin, James, ed. 1999. Epistemology. Philosophical Perspectives, 13. Blackwell Publishing.
  • Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1922. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Conv. C. K. Ogden. Dover. Liber interretialis.