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Philosophia continentalis

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Henricus Bergson anno 1927, philosophus continentalis, qui Praemium Nobelianum litterarum eodem anno accepit.

Philosophia continentalis est copia traditionum philosophicarum saeculorum undevicensimo et vicensimo in Europa continentali promulgatarum.[1][2] Hic vocabuli sensus inter philosophos Anglice loquentes altero dimidio saeculi vicensimi ortus est, qui cogitatores et traditiones praeter motum analyticum olim attingebat. Inter motus quos philosophia continentalis amplectitur sunt idealismus Germanus, phaenomenologia, exsistentialismus (et eius antecedentes, sicut cogitatio Kierkegaardiana et Nietzschiana), hermeneutica, structuralismus, poststructuralismus, feminismus Francicus, ratio psychoanalytica, et ratio critica Scholae Francofurtensis et cognatorum Marxismi Occidentalis ramorum.[3]

Difficile est agnoscere affirmationes magni momenti quae in omnibus motibus philosophicis prioribus saepe inveniuntur. Locutio philosophia continentalis, sicut philosophia analytica, definitione clara caret, et solum similitudinem familiarem in diversis opinionibus philosophicis indicare potest. Simon Glendinning vocabulum proponit primum plus detrectavisse quam descripsisse, pro pittacio generum philosophiae occidentalis reiectae vel in odio a philosophis analyticis habitae.[4] Nihilominus, Michael E. Rosen quattuor propositiones communes ponit quae proprietates philosophiae continentalis haberi possunt.[5]

Primo, philosophia continentalis notionem scientias naturales esse solum vel accuratissimum modum rerum naturae intellegendarum plerumque reicit. Quae a multis philosophis analyticis dissentit qui putant eorum percontationes continuas aut subiectas illis scientiarum naturalium. Philosophi continentales saepe affirmant scientiam dependere ex "praerationali experientiae substrato" (translatione condicionum Kantianarum experientiae quae fieri potest vel mundi vitalis phaenomenorum) et rationes scientificas esse impares talium intelligibilitatis condicionum funditus comprehendere.[6]

Secundo, philosophia continentalis has condiciones experientiae quae fieri potest variabiles esse, saltem partim a contextu, spatio et tempore, lingua, cultura, historia, aliisque rebus determinatas. Philosophia continentalis sic ad historicismum inclinat. Ubi philosophia analytica philosophiam in quaestionibus certis tractare solet, quae praeter earum origines historicas explicari potest (multum ut physici historiam scientiae inquisitionibus scientificis non necessariam putant), philosophia continentalis usitate affirmat "argumentum philosophicum a textualibus et contextualibus eius ortus historici statibus separari non potest."[7][8]

Tertio, philosophia continentalis usitate affirmat actionem humanam hos status experientiae quae fieri potest mutare potest: "si experientia humana est status contingens, tum aliter recreari potest."[9][10] Philosophi continentales sic studium in unitate rationis et usus vehementer habere solent, saepeque habent eorum percontationes philosophicas ad commutationem personalem, moralem, vel politicam arte pertinere. Haec inclinatio clarissima est in traditione Marxista ("modis variis, philosophi mundum solum interpretati sunt; quem autem quaestio est commutare."[11]), sed etiam in existentialismo et poststructuralismo maximi monenti est.

Claudius Lévi-Strauss, humanitatibus paradigma structurale adhibuit. Photographema Novembre 2005.

Quarto, philosophia continentalis metaphilosophiam vehementius dicit. Post progressum et successum scientiarum naturalium, philosophi continentales saepe rationem et naturam philiosophiae ipsius denuo definire conati sunt.[12] Quod in nonnullis modis (sicut idealismus Germanus vel phaenomenologia), redintegratio apparet notionis usitate philosophiam a priori esse primam scientiam, fundamenta rei. In aliis modis (sicut hermeneutica, ratio critica, et structuralismus), philosophis habetur investigare dominium quod culturale vel prorsus effectivum est. Et nonnulli philosophi continentales (sicut Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Martinus Heidegger senex, et Iacobus Derrida) dubitant an ulla notio philosophica eius fines dictos adipisci possit.

Ad ultimum, propositiones supra dictae a proposito late Kantiano deducuntur: quod scientia, experientia, et realitas ligantur et formantur a condicionibus per cogitationem philosophicam optime intellectis, potius quam quaestio solum empirica.[13]

Nexus interni

Notae[recensere | fontem recensere]

  1. Leiter 2007: "As a first approximation, we might say that philosophy in Continental Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is best understood as a connected weave of traditions, some of which overlap, but no one of which dominates all the others."
  2. Critchley et Schroder 1998:4.
  3. Hic index solum motus in ambobus indicibus a Critchley 2001:13 et Glendinning 2006:58–65 compositis comprehendit.
  4. Glendinning 2006:12.
  5. Hic index proprietatum quattuor ex Rosen (p. 665) capitur.
  6. Critchley 2001:.
  7. Anglice: "philosophical argument cannot be divorced from the textual and contextual conditions of its historical emergence."
  8. Critchley 2001:57.
  9. Anglice: "if human experience is a contingent creation, then it can be recreated in other ways."
  10. Critchley 2001:64.
  11. Thesis undecima (Anglice): "philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."
  12. Leiter 2007:4: "While forms of philosophical naturalism have been dominant in Anglophone philosophy, the vast majority of authors within the Continental traditions insist on the distinctiveness of philosophical methods and their priority to those of the natural sciences."
  13. Philosophi continentales tales status usitate conectunt cum re vel se transcendentali: "It is with Kant that philosophical claims about the self attain new and remarkable proportions. The self becomes not just the focus of attention but the entire subject-matter of philosophy. The self is not just another entity in the world, but in an important sense it creates the world, and the reflecting self does not just know itself, but in knowing itself knows all selves, and the structure of any and every possible self" (Solomon 1988:6).

Bibliographia[recensere | fontem recensere]

  • Babich, Babette. 2003. On the Analytic-Continental Divide in Philosophy: Nietzsche’s Lying Truth, Heidegger’s Speaking Language, and Philosophy. In A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy, ed. C. G. Prado, 63–103. Amherst Novi Eboraci: Prometheus / Humanity Books.
  • Critchley, Simon. 2001. Continental Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction. Oxoniae et Novi Eboraci: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-285359-7.
  • Critchley, Simon, et William Schroder, eds. 1998. Introduction: what is continental philosophy? In A Companion to Continental Philosophy. Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Malden Massachusettae: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
  • Cutrofello, Andrew. 2005. Continental Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction. Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy. Novi Eboraci: Abingdon, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.
  • Glendinning, Simon. 2006. The idea of continental philosophy: a philosophical chronicle. Edimburgi: Edinburgh University Press Ltd.
  • Leiter, Brian, et Michael Rosen, eds. 2007. The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy. Oxoniae et Novi Eboraci: Oxford University Press.
  • Rosen, Michael E. Continental Philosophy from Hegel. In Philosophy 2: Further through the Subject, ed. A. C. Grayling.
  • Schrift, Alan D. 2010. The History of Continental Philosophy. Sicagi: University of Chicago Press Press.
  • Solomon, Robert C. 1988. Continental philosophy since 1750: the rise and fall of the self. Oconiae et Novi Eboraci: Oxford University Press.
  • Kenny, Anthony. 2007. Philosophy in the Modern World. A New History of Western Philosophy, 4. Novi Eboraci: Oxford University Press.