Liberum arbitrium

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Spinoza, qui liberum arbitrium negavit. Pictura a Francisco Wulfhagen anno 1664 facta.

Liberum arbitrium[1] est mentis et voluntatis gubernatio soluta ab omnibus rebus quae agendi licentiae intervenire possint. Liberum arbitrium homines sive actores rationales sinit facere quidquid quocumque loco iudicent optimum factu esse. Quod soli homines hanc potestatem habere videntur, actus liber dicitur actus humanus in philosophia.[2]

Negatio liberi arbitrii, quae determinismus appellatur, saepe quaestionem moralitatis parit quia facultatem voluntatis humanae de bonis ac malis negare potest.

Theoria Spinozae de Deo ut causa sui, causalitas vel praedestinatio Calvinismi liberum arbitrium de facto negat. Sed clinamen Lucretii determinismum causalitatis refutavit.

Notae[recensere | fontem recensere]

Bibliographia[recensere | fontem recensere]

  • Baer, John, James C. Kaufman, et Roy F. Baumeister. 2008. Are We Free? Psychology and Free Will. Novi Eboraci: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-518963-9.
  • Bischof, Michael H. 2004. Kann ein Konzept der Willensfreiheit auf das Prinzip der alternativen Möglichkeiten verzichten? Harry G. Frankfurts Kritik am Prinzip der alternativen Möglichkeiten (PAP). Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 4.
  • Dennett, Daniel C. 2003. Freedom Evolves. Novi Eboraci Viking Press. ISBN 0-670-03186-0.
  • Eisenrauch, Andreas 2012: Der Einfall und die Freiheit -Lebensweltliche Indikatoren der Unfreiheit menschlichen Denkens. Civitas septentrionis: BoD. ISBN 978-3-8482-0487-8.
  • Epstein Joshua M. 1999. Agent Based Models and Generative Social Science. Complexity 4(5).
  • Gazzaniga, M., et M. S. Steven. 2004. Free Will in the 21st Century: A Discussion of Neuroscience and Law. In Neuroscience and the Law: Brain, Mind and the Scales of Justice, ed B. Garland, 51–70. Novi Eboraci: Dana Press. ISBN 1-932594-04-3.
  • Goodenough, O. R. 2004. Responsibility and punishment. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences, special issue: Law and the Brain 359: 1805–1809.
  • Harnad, Stevan. 1982. Consciousness: An Afterthought. Cognition and Brain Theory 5: 29–47.
  • Hofstadter, Douglas. 2007. I Am A Strange Loop. Basic Books. ISBN 978-0-465-03078-1.
  • Kane, Robert. 1998. The Significance of Free Will. Novi Eboraci: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-512656-4.
  • Lawhead, William F. 2005. The Philosophical Journey: An Interactive Approach. McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages. ISBN 0-07-296355-7.
  • Libet, Benjamin, Anthony Freeman, et Keith Sutherland, eds. 1999. The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will. Conlecti scientistarum et philosophorum commentarii. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
  • Morris, Tom. Philosophy for Dummies. IDG Books. ISBN 0-7645-5153-1.
  • Muhm, Myriam. 2004. larchivio.org Abolito il libero arbitrio—Colloquio con Wolf Singer. L'Espresso 19 Augusti.
  • Nowak, A., R. R. Vallacher, A. Tesser, et W. Borkowski. 2000. Society of Self: The emergence of collective properties in self-structure. Psychological Review. 107.
  • Schopenhauer, Arthur. 1839. On the Freedom of the Will.? Oxoniae: Basil Blackwell. ISBN 0-631-14552-4.
  • Van Inwagen, Peter. 1986. An Essay on Free Will. Novi Eboraci: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-824924-1.
  • Velmans, Max. 2003. How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains? Exeter: Imprint Academic ISBN 0-907845-39-8.
  • Wegner, D. 2002. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cantabrigiae: Bradford Books
  • Williams, Clifford. 1980. Free Will and Determinism: A Dialogue. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co.

Formula:Phil-stipula

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