Trivialismus

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Trivialismus in logica symbolica: lege "ulla propositio data est propositio vera."

Trivialismus est theoria logica quae proponit omnia dicta (etiam propositiones appellata) vera esse, omnesque contradictiones generis "p et non p" (in exemplo "pila est ruber et non ruber}) veras esse. Secundum quod, trivialista est homo qui credat omnia esse vera.[1][2]

Nexus interni

Notae[recensere | fontem recensere]

  1. Priest 2007: 131.
  2. Kabay 2010.

Nexus externi[recensere | fontem recensere]

Commons-logo.svg Vicimedia Communia plura habent quae ad trivialismum spectant. (hic nexus fractus videtur)

Bibliographia[recensere | fontem recensere]

  • Kroon, Frederick. 2004. Realism and Dialetheism. In The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, ed. Graham Priest, J. C. Beall, et Bradley Armour-Garb. Oxoniae: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-926517-6
  • Immanuel [sic]. 2014. Instrumentalist Science of Zen Philosophy: Applied Ad Hoc Trivialism. Zen Applied Science.
  • Kabay, Paul. 2010. On the Plenitude of Truth: A Defense of Trivialism. Lambert Academic Publishing. ISBN 978-3-8383-5102-5.
  • Priest, Graham. 2007. Paraconsistency and Dialetheism. In The Many Valued and Nonmonotonic Turn in Logic, ed. Dov M. Gabbay et John Woods, 131. Elsevier. ISBN 978-0-444-51623-7.