Lex Humiana

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David Humius quaestionem est-debet in Treatise of Human Nature rogavit.
Humius rogat, cum cognitum modi per quem universum est habeamus, quali sensu dicere possumus id variare debere.

Lex Humiana est distinctio a Davide Humio, philosopho et rerum gestarum scriptore Scotico (1711–1776) excogitata, nam multos scriptores dixit a dictis descriptivis imprudenter ad dicta aestimativa concludere solere.[1] Humius autem hoc illis philosophis vitio vertebat, nam negavit a dictis descriptivis (sicut est) ad dicta aestimativa (sicut esse debet) transiri posse. Lex Humiana ('no ought from is') interdum etiam guillotina Humiana appellatur.[2]

Sententia similis per argumentum quaestionis apertae a G. E. Moore ad ullam comparationem proprietatum moralium cum proprietatibus naturalibus redarguendam positum est. Hoc captio naturalistica (ut appellatur) contra opiniones naturalistarum ethicorum stat.

Nexus interni

Notae[recensere | fontem recensere]

  1. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature 3.1.1.27.
  2. Hare 1952: 29; Black 1964.

Bibliographia[recensere | fontem recensere]

  • Black, Max (1964) The Gap Between "Is" and "Should." The Philosophical Review 73 (2): 165. ISSN 0031-8108. doi:10.2307/2183334.
  • Falk, W.D. (1976) Hume on Is and Ought, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6: 359–378.
  • Flew, Antony (1964) On Not Deriving 'Ought' from 'Is'. Analysis 25: 25–32.
  • Hare, R.M. (1952) The Language of Morals. Oxford University Press.
  • Hunter, Geoffrey (1962) Hume on Is and Ought. Philosophy 37: 148–152.
  • Hudson, William Donald (1969) The Is/Ought Question: A Collection of Papers on the Central Problem in Moral Philosophy. Macmillan.
  • Pidgen, Charles R. (2010) Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave Macmillan.
  • Schurz, Gerhard (1997) The Is-Ought Problem: An Investigation in Philosophical Logic. Kluwer.

Nexus externi[recensere | fontem recensere]