Disputatio Usoris:Wmdiem/Glossarium Thomisticum

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Page name[fontem recensere]

[discussion moved from Disputatio:Glossarium Thomisticum ] Unless you plan just to translate it here, it may be better to move this english page to your namespace ie to Usor:Wmdiem/Glossarium Thomisticum. Pages that are part of the encyclopedia namespace should be written in latin.--Rafaelgarcia 20:55, 4 Maii 2008 (UTC)[reply]

I copied it to Usor:Wmdiem/Glossarium Thomisticum. It seems Usor:Andrew_Dalby made the original page a redirect. I only put it here as a result of the suggestions [1]. Didn't mean to make a mess. Wmdiem 21:10, 4 Maii 2008 (UTC)[reply]
No mess. All is quite normal. Moves and redirects are frequent! If you intend to convert the glossary into all-Latin (or nearly-all-Latin) eventually, it could then be moved back to Glossarium Thomisticum. Andrew Dalby (disputatio) 08:52, 5 Maii 2008 (UTC)[reply]
In this case, I think it would be useful have both english and latin versions.--Rafaelgarcia 12:13, 5 Maii 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Why is it that being blind is not an act but having sight is an act? Neither one involves an active changing, as far as I can understand. THe difference from what you write, seems to be one of having a positive attribute. But what makes something a "positive" attribute?--Rafaelgarcia 23:47, 4 Maii 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Or do you mean "seeing" by the term "having sight"?--Rafaelgarcia 23:49, 4 Maii 2008 (UTC)[reply]
The distinctin is beteen positing something in the real and negating something that is in the real. The distinciton can be fuzzy at times and led to a number of disputes (e.g., is infinitas a real attribute?). A similar idea arises in disussions of evil: Evil it was taken for granted does obtain, (exist in a loose sense) but strictly is a privation, that is strictly it does not exist. Indeed this is how Aquinas defines evil, a lack of what ought to be. To your well-placed question: what makes an attribute positive, the intuitive answer is circular, It is positive if it is caused by some act or real addition of being. If one wants to break the circle it seems to lead to the question of whether some attribute is a completion of a subject or a privation. In the case of sight vs. blindness, if having sight perfects, completes, or compliments the nature of the subject it can be assumed to be a real act of the thing, whereas lacking sight is a privation. It is important to realise that a stable state or attribute can be an act. Indeed privation and more limited being/act are characteristically in motion (motion implies reduction of potency to act, and usually the generation of a new potency, i.e., to move back to the original state). What is more perfect and more complete (thus having more complete act) tends to be more stable. Thus at the top, Ipsum Esse subsistens (i.e., God) Who is pure act without potency, is believed to be unchanging. I think the beggining of the de principiis naturae is a really good explanation of what is going on, and if you are interested in this I would highly recommend having a look.[2]Is this at all helpful or just clear as mud?Wmdiem 00:18, 5 Maii 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Do actus primus and actus secundus correspond to (1) and (2) or is it a separate categorization? It seems more as if (2) corresponds to actus primus and (1) to actus secundus from what you say at the end.--Rafaelgarcia 17:48, 5 Maii 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Wait a minute: isn't having the "power to act" without excercising that power" (given in the definiton of actus primus) a "potentia" rather than an "actus"?--Rafaelgarcia 18:08, 5 Maii 2008 (UTC)[reply]
IN the first line:"A (metaphysical) act (includes the act of being)." What do the parentheses mean? Does it mean only "Any act of metaphysical import, which includes the act of simply being something, if that something is judged to be "positive" according to Thomistic philosophy."--Rafaelgarcia 18:03, 5 Maii 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Or perhaps, "Any act of metaphysical import whereby an entity actualizes some potential inherent in it. This includes the act of simply being something if that being actualizes a potential in the object."--Rafaelgarcia 18:11, 5 Maii 2008 (UTC)[reply]
Yes there is a corespondence between actus primus/secundus and the two definitions. I can add that. potentia is a somewhat equivocal term, in some sense power and potency are opposites: a potency alone cannot act, but a power is a source of motion. Thus it is imperative to keep straight how potentia is being used. A power in first act, is an act insofar as it is a real aspect of the subject. Think of your ability to speak English (possibly a bad example, but the first thing that came to mind). It is a real aspect of you whether you are using it or not (and it is in potentia to second act), it is reduced to second act only when you actually start speaking; you remain Anglophonic whether you are talking or not. Perhaps it would be well to think of it as one act creating a potency to a second act, which happens all the time, one act creates the possibility for a further act. I suppose the emphasis in the definition of first act is on the "having" some completion. As to parentheticals: The "metaphysical" is meant to show that the term is speaking of act in a metaphysical sense, and thus has an extremely broad scope, which the "including being" was meant to reinforce. I was trying to emphasise the broadness of the term. BTW, feel free to edit if my wording and punctuation are too convoluted.

Thomistic words as translations of Aristotelian terms[fontem recensere]

It seems to me that the majority of these Thomistic words and expressions were introduced by Thomas (or before him) to translate Aristotelian terms. It might be useful to add the corresponding Greek words as well. --Fabullus 17:54, 5 Maii 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Yes I think many were Latin translation either of Arabic translation of Aristotle or direct translations from Greek. Aside from obvious ones (phusica->natura, hule->materia, morphe->forma) I don't know much Aristotelian vocabulary. But Deferarri has them so I could lift from there. I don't think I will have time to do this for a while.

Is "forma" as used by Thomas the same as for Aristotle or the same as Plato, or different from both of these.?--Rafaelgarcia 00:49, 6 Maii 2008 (UTC)[reply]

It is of course a translation of Arisotelian 'eidos', though Thomas may have develloped the concept in his own particular way. 'Natura' translates Greek 'phusis'. Many of these translations predate Thomas by many centuries, some even dating back to antiquity. It is the ones like 'essentia' and 'entia' or 'quiditas', which were especially coined for these translations (by Thomas or earlier), that intrigue me in particular. --Fabullus 06:11, 6 Maii 2008 (UTC)[reply]
foot in mouth. I've never studied Plato or Aristotle in Greek so I will just wait until I get back to my library to make any more comments about etymology.Wmdiem 16:02, 6 Maii 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Introduction[fontem recensere]

I just started Usor:Wmdiem/Philosophiae_Thomisticae_introductio_ingredientibus (the "ingredientibus" is meant to qualify the pretentions of the page, not the reader's intelligence) to deal with the concepts more fully and systematically than seems appropriate in a glossary. Does this seem useful to anyone (I.e., ought I continue writing)? Wmdiem 19:16, 5 Maii 2008 (UTC)[reply]